For post-conflict governance models in Iraq and Libya to be effective, it is crucial to recognize the presence of ‘hybrid’ armed groups and integrate them into the state rebuilding process. Success hinges on fostering accountability within these groups while acknowledging their role in the broader reconstruction efforts.
State weakness and protracted conflict continue to plague Iraq and Libya. A breakdown of the unitary state, competition for power and influence, and the absence of a social contract all continue to drive conflict, while allowing a proliferation of local armed groups to flourish.
In Iraq and Libya, armed groups are frequently perceived solely as security entities, but a more accurate characterization identifies them as ‘hybrid‘ networks spanning political, economic, and social domains. Effectively addressing the threats posed by these groups requires Western policies to go beyond traditional security interventions. Instead, a comprehensive and inclusive approach emphasizing accountability becomes essential, recognizing it as a pathway to sustainable peace in the region.
For the beginnings of a durable rules-based order to emerge, assumptions about the dynamics of state power in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) must be reconsidered.
The infiltration of armed groups into civilian life is unmistakably apparent in both Iraq and Libya. With ineffective governance and a lack of public services, militias and paramilitaries are seizing opportunities to establish their presence, creating their own social contracts with local populations in the absence of robust state control.
In response to this phenomenon, many Western peacekeeping and state-building initiatives continue to focus on either the demobilization of armed groups or their integration into official ‘state’ forces, in order to establish a monopoly over legitimate violence. However, such approaches have never worked in the region.
